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LIMITED OVERSIGHT: THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS VIS-À-VIS THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY IN
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR ACT
DAVID T. BUENTE, JR., WILLIAM E. GERARD, JOEL F. VISSER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In creating the modern environmental regulatory state, Congress
assigned the primary responsibility for implementation of the statutes
1
to federal and state regulators. Environmental statutory schemes
tend to provide only broad guidelines, and executive agencies such as
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are expected to fill
in the gaps through rulemakings, permit issuance, and enforcement
actions. Given their technical expertise, the agencies are supposed to
be well equipped to create detailed regulations that implement
Congress’s goal of a clean and healthy environment. This delegation
of authority is significant because, in most cases, EPA and state
regulators are given freedom to choose the content of environmental
regulations. In the context of the Clean Air Act, the subject of this
article, they choose what pollutants will be regulated, which sources
of pollutants will be among the regulated entities, what standards will
be imposed upon those regulated entities, the deadline by which
those standards will be met, and, finally, whether or not the
2
regulations will be enforced.
In light of this broad delegation of authority, Congress plays a
surprisingly small role in overseeing the content of EPA’s regulations.

* David T. Buente, Partner, Sidley Austin LLP; William E. Gerard, Associate, Sidley
Austin LLP; Joel F. Visser, Associate, Sidley Austin LLP.
1. Including some local and tribal authorities.
2. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007)
(acknowledging that EPA was not required to regulate a pollutant unless it first made an
endangerment finding); id. (“EPA no doubt has significant latitude as to the manner, timing,
content and coordination of its regulations with those of other agencies.”); id. at 527 (“[A]n
agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel
to carry out its delegated responsibilities. That discretion is at its height when an agency decides
not to bring an enforcement action.” (citation omitted)).
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Congress rarely takes legislative action in response to perceived
inadequacies in EPA’s regulatory approach. Instead, its oversight
actions are largely limited to appropriations legislation and oversight
3
hearings, which create no binding legal authority. The role of federal
oversight of EPA and other executive agencies has fallen on the
judiciary. Under the Clean Air Act, federal courts are given authority
to hear petitions challenging final agency actions such as rulemakings,
petitions asserting that EPA has failed to undertake nondiscretionary
duties such as regular review of National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS), and civil and criminal enforcement matters.
Thus, with respect to virtually every aspect of agency action (or
inaction) there is at least an opportunity to challenge EPA’s
regulatory decisions in federal court.
Although it is often taken for granted that the federal judiciary
plays a substantial role in shaping environmental law, a closer
examination reveals considerable variability based on the type of
action that is before the court. Specifically, this article examines the
significance of the federal judiciary’s role in shaping environmental
law by comparing the relative power of EPA and the courts under the
various provisions for judicial oversight. The article finds that a
federal court’s power is at its apex when engaging in statutory
interpretation of specific provisions of the Clean Air Act during
4
challenges to final agency action under section 307. From this high
point, the federal judiciary’s power is diminished as the standards of
review become more deferential, the content of the courts’ decisions
becomes less substantive, and EPA retains additional authority to
resolve disputes without judicial intervention.
In order to assess the judiciary’s role in shaping environmental
law, this article focuses on EPA action (or inaction) under the Clean
Air Act. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA and the federal courts can
interact in two primary ways: through suits challenging EPA’s
regulatory approach and through EPA enforcement actions alleging
violations of the Act. With respect to each type of interaction, this
article will articulate the legal basis for the judiciary’s oversight role, a
description of the content of those interactions, and, finally, an
analysis of the significance of the federal judiciary’s role in shaping

3. See generally Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration
and Congressional Procedure, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 199 (1998) (describing procedures for
congressional oversight of agency action).
4. Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2006). Section 307 of the Clean Air Act
authorizes judicial review of final agency actions. See infra section II.
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the content of the Clean Air Act. Sections II and III of the article will
address judicial review of citizens’ suit petitions challenging final
5
EPA action under section 307(b) and allegations that EPA has failed
6
to act to regulate under section 304(a)(2). Section IV will address the
federal judiciary’s role in enforcement of the Clean Air Act.
II. CHALLENGES TO FINAL AGENCY ACTION: SECTION 307
Challenges to final EPA action under section 307 of the Clean
Air Act are not only the most common suits involving EPA under this
7
act, they also provide the courts with the greatest ability to influence
future EPA action through statutory construction. Section 307
petitions often involve both questions of statutory interpretation,
8
which are reviewed under the Chevron doctrine, and questions of the
propriety of EPA’s final action based on the administrative record,
which are reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. The
courts’ power is greatest with respect to EPA during a Chevron stepone analysis, where the courts engage in de novo review of the
statutory provisions that EPA is required to implement. If the review
process continues to Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious
review, the courts’ relative power wanes as review standards become
more deferential and case-specific. In addition, threshold
considerations such as justiciability and waiver somewhat constrain
the availability of section 307 challenges to litigants.
This section will first describe the types of interactions that occur
between EPA and the courts in section 307 challenges and then assess
the significance of these interactions.
A. Statutory Background
Pursuant to section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, judicial review
of final agency actions under a number of Clean Air Act provisions is
9
available only in the federal courts of appeals. Final actions that are
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).
6. Id. §7604(a)(2).
7. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?: An Empirical Analysis of EPA
Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 771 (2008) (finding that 75% of “economically
significant” rules issued by EPA between 2001 and 2005 were challenged after issuance).
8. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). A similar judicial review process is provided in a number of
other statutory schemes administered by EPA. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)
(2006); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(1)(A) (2006). In the event that a
statutory scheme lacks express judicial review provisions, the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) provides a cause of action for review of “final agency action for which there is no other
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national in scope must be brought in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, while final actions involving local or
regional standards must be brought in the court of appeals with
10
jurisdiction over the locality or region. Once EPA has published
notice of a final action in the Federal Register, a party has sixty days
11
within which to file a petition for review. Petitions for review are of
special significance to regulated entities because they may be barred
from challenging the substance of the final agency action during
12
enforcement proceedings. Finally, a party challenging a final agency
action must also satisfy a number of threshold issues before its
challenge will be heard on the merits. These include justiciability
13
issues and waiver.
B. Threshold Issues
A petitioner challenging a final EPA action under section 307
must satisfy several threshold criteria before proceeding to the merits.

adequate remedy,” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), with jurisdiction supplied by the federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
11. Id. Filling a request for reconsideration with EPA does not serve to toll the 60-day
statute of limitations. Id. However, a petition may be filed more than 60 days after publication if
it is based on “grounds arising after such sixtieth day,” in which case the petition must be filed
within 60 days after such grounds arise. Id. In addition, a final action may be challenged after a
subsequent rulemaking if EPA “reopens” the issue. Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 551
F.3d 1019, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he time for seeking review starts anew where the agency
reopens an issue ‘by holding out the unchanged section as a proposed regulation, offering an
explanation for its language, soliciting comments on its substance, and responding to the
comments in promulgating the regulation in its final form.’” (citations omitted)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (“Action of the Administrator with respect to which review
could have been obtained under [Section 307(b)(1)] shall not be subject to judicial review in
civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.”). However, a defendant in an enforcement
action is not completely foreclosed from challenging EPA’s application of a rule during
enforcement. See United States v. Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d 705, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2006) (allowing
defendant to challenge the meaning of a regulation during enforcement action); see also Envtl.
Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 573 (2007) (“[N]o precise line runs between a
purposeful but permissible reading of the regulation adopted to bring it into harmony with the
Court of Appeals’s view of the statute, and a determination that the regulation as written is
invalid.”).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (“Only an objection to a rule or procedure which was raised
with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment (including any public hearing)
may be raised during judicial review.”); Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 370 F.3d 1232, 1238–40 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that the waiver rule is “strictly
enforced” and holding that letters submitted to EPA lacked the specificity needed to satisfy the
rule). However, a petitioner is not precluded from objecting to an aspect of the agency’s
decision which could not have been addressed during the public comment period. 42 U.S.C. §
7607(d)(7)(B).
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These threshold criteria are nevertheless an important part of the
14
review process. First, they are frequently litigated and therefore
represent a significant investment of time and resources for both EPA
and the courts. Second, they are of great importance to EPA because
they insulate it from challenges by plaintiffs that did not participate in
the rulemaking process or otherwise lack a sufficient interest in
EPA’s action. If EPA were unable to resolve these challenges on the
basis of threshold criteria, they might otherwise impede its ability to
effectively administer the Clean Air Act. This section will briefly
describe the role of justiciability, the statute of limitations, and waiver
in section 307 cases.
A petitioner seeking review under section 307 must have
15
standing to challenge a final agency action. Due to the direct effect
that EPA actions typically have on state and local governments and
regulated entities, actions brought by these entities are rarely
16
vulnerable to standing challenges. Instead, standing challenges are
generally directed toward environmental non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and similarly situated plaintiffs, who may be
17
affected more tangentially by EPA actions.
Second, a petitioner seeking to challenge a final EPA action
must do so within sixty days after notice of the action is published in
18
the Federal Register. Perhaps due to the straightforward nature of
this requirement, it is rarely litigated directly. Instead, the issue is
litigated in the context of the “reopening doctrine.” Under this
doctrine, an otherwise time-barred claim can be maintained if, in a
subsequent agency action, EPA “reopened” the issue by considering

14. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741,
1758–60 (1999) (identifying thirty-three circuit court cases from 1992 to 1998 deciding whether
an environmental plaintiff had standing to challenge EPA action).
15. In order to establish constitutional standing under Article III, a plaintiff must meet
injury, causation, and redressability requirements. North Carolina v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
587 F.3d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992)).
16. To the extent that government entities urge EPA to take more aggressive regulatory
action, they act in a similar manner to environmental proponents and may be subjected to
standing arguments. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 54–56
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (addressing whether states had standing to challenge EPA’s determination that
it lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants), rev’d 549 U.S. 487 (2007).
However, standing challenges may be less significant for states under the CAA, because they
are entitled to “special solicitude in [the court’s] standing analysis.” Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot, Agency, 549 U.S. at 520.
17. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
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19

it anew. In Sierra Club v. EPA, the court agreed that “the text of the
20
general duty rule itself did not change” in a subsequent rulemaking
but found that other changes in the regulatory scheme “constructively
reopened” its assessment of the general duty rule which was timely
21
challenged.
Finally, a petitioner may not ordinarily challenge an aspect of a
final EPA action for the first time in the courts of appeals. Unless the
petitioner brought the issue to EPA’s attention during the notice and
22
comment period, the challenge is deemed waived. This issue—
23
sometimes known as issue exhaustion —is typically litigated in one of
two ways. The first involves a situation where the petitioner did
comment on a proposed rule, but EPA asserts that the comment
lacked the requisite specificity to put it on notice of the petitioner’s
24
objection. The second situation involves changes made by EPA after
25
the close of the public comment period. Because a petitioner has no
opportunity to comment on the changes prior to EPA’s final action,
26
such challenges are not deemed waived.
While stopping short of the merits, these threshold issues
produce real conflicts which require resolution by the courts of
appeals. The conflicts are high-stakes because a successful outcome
may shield EPA’s final action from review and prevent any
meaningful oversight by the courts. In addition, these issues allow the
courts to undertake a detailed review of EPA’s decision-making

19. 551 F.3d 1019, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he time for seeking review starts anew where
the agency reopens an issue ‘by holding out the unchanged section as a proposed regulation,
offering an explanation for its language, soliciting comments on its substance, and responding to
the comments in promulgating the regulation in its final form.’” (citations omitted)), cert. denied
sub nom. Am. Chemistry Council v. Sierra Club, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010).
20. Id. at 1025.
21. Id. at 1026 (“Shifting from a regulatory scheme based on a mandatory SSM plan that
was part of a source’s Title V permit, which is subject to prior approval with public involvement,
see 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6), to a regulatory scheme with a non-mandatory plan providing for no
such approval or involvement but only after-the-fact reporting changed the calculus for
petitioners in seeking judicial review, id., and thereby constructively reopened consideration of
the exemption from section 112 emission standards during SSM events.”).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B).
23. See, e.g., William Funk, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies—New Dimensions
Since Darby, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000).
24. Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. U.S. Envtl. Prot Agency, 370 F.3d 1232, 1239–40 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (finding that petitioner’s letters challenging MACT floors did not imply a challenge
to EPA’s failure to set beyond-the-floor MACT standards as well).
25. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 509 F.3d 553, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). However, the petitioner must still seek redress from EPA
prior to filing suit by filing a petition for reconsideration with the agency. Id.
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process to determine whether a merits-based review is warranted.
Even if this review is not substantive, it is still invasive and may serve
to alter EPA’s future decision-making processes.
C. Merits-Based Analysis
Once a petitioner has satisfied all of the threshold requirements,
the court can consider the merits of the final agency action. Typically
this involves a multi-step analysis of EPA’s statutory authority to take
the final action, followed by a case-specific analysis of EPA’s
decision-making process. A court’s statutory interpretation is guided
27
by the familiar two-step Chevron doctrine. Under this doctrine,
[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter,
for the courts as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue . . . the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.28

If the court concludes that EPA’s interpretation of the statute at issue
is reasonable, it will then review the administrative record to
determine whether the agency’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious,
29
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
The following sections will describe in more detail the resolution of
each of these issues in the courts.
1. Chevron Step One
Chevron step one issues are frequently litigated during
30
challenges to final agency action. Under this step, the court conducts
an independent analysis of the relevant statute to determine whether
31
its meaning is clear. Because this step does not require any
deference to EPA’s preferred interpretation, it is a favorite of
petitions challenging EPA actions, regardless of the identity or

27. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
28. Id. at 842–43.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
30. For example, Schroeder & Glicksman’s survey of rulemaking challenges in the Courts
of Appeals identified 111 challenges to EPA rulemaking between 1990 and 1999, of which 83
raised a Chevron issue. Christopher Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm,
and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,371, 10,377 (2001).
31. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1364, 1371
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
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32

ideology of the petitioner. By contrast, EPA prefers to argue that
any given statute is ambiguous because statutory ambiguity allows for
33
increased agency discretion. Moreover, because Chevron step one
includes a threshold question regarding Congressional intent, it must
be addressed—at least implicitly—in every case, unless there is clear
34
precedent addressing the interpretation of the statute at issue.
Given EPA’s preference for asserting that the statutes it
administers are ambiguous, it is not surprising that EPA fares poorly
on cases resolved under Chevron step one. In fact, a study of
challenges to EPA rulemaking in the courts of appeals in the 1990s
found that, when an issue was decided on the basis of Chevron step
35
one, EPA lost fifty-nine percent of the time. A review of challenges
to final actions of the Bush Administration EPA confirms this
finding. For example, the Bush Administration EPA issued a series of
rules regarding Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT)
standards under Clean Air Act section 112, and every challenge
resolved under Chevron step one resulted in the court vacating EPA’s
36
rule. However, only considering cases resolved under Chevron step
one skews the results against EPA because it ignores challenges
which are ultimately resolved at later stages, but which proceed
37
38
through an implicit or explicit finding that a statute was ambiguous
under step one.

32. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1250, 1257–61
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (environmental NGO challenging EPA definition of “commercial or industrial
waste”); New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 3, 38–40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (government
and environmental NGOs challenging EPA’s “Clean Units” exception); North Carolina v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 921–22 (D.C. Cir.2008) (regulated entity challenging EPA
rule regarding CAA Title IV allowances).
33. Even if EPA were convinced that it had correctly interpreted a clear statute, it would
have little incentive to make an argument under Chevron step one. To the extent that its
interpretation is correct under Chevron step one, it would also be reasonable under Chevron
step two. By arguing under Chevron step two, the EPA retains the discretion to change course
and adopt a different interpretation in the future.
34. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 353 F.3d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“In National Lime, this court confirmed that ‘EPA may use a surrogate to regulate pollutants it
if is reasonable to do so.’”).
35. Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 30, at 10,377.
36. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 479 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Natural
Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Natural Res. Def.
Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
37. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 982 (implying that an ambiguity in the statute
permitted EPA to use a surrogate to regulate hazardous pollutants).
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2. Chevron Step Two
If a court finds a statute ambiguous under Chevron step one, it
must defer to any reasonable EPA interpretation under Chevron step
two. Indeed, “[t]he agency’s interpretation need not be the only
permissible reading of the statute, nor the interpretation that the
39
court might have originally given the statute.” Given the deferential
review standard under Chevron step two, it is not surprising that EPA
is often successful when cases are resolved on this issue. In fact, prior
studies have found EPA success rates of around ninety percent for
40
Chevron step two cases. Moreover, the court’s deference under
Chevron step two extends not only to EPA’s initially selected
interpretation, but also to subsequent decisions to change its
41
preferred interpretation. Thus, a finding of ambiguity gives EPA
continuing flexibility to determine how to implement statutory
provisions.
However, EPA’s discretion is not unbounded, and courts may
vacate any EPA action based on an unreasonable interpretation of an
otherwise ambiguous statute. For example, in North Carolina v. EPA,
the D.C. Circuit addressed a challenge to the Clean Air Interstate
Rule which permitted the trading of emissions credits for sulfur
42
dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Although the court found the relevant
statute ambiguous, it vacated the rule because it conflicted with
another provision requiring the elimination of emissions from sources
43
contributing to nonattainment in downwind states. Thus, even an
ambiguous statute may include sufficient limits to bind the range of
EPA discretion. To the extent that EPA abuses its discretion by
exceeding those limits, the court can vacate the rule.
3. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
If the court finds that EPA has selected a proper interpretation
of the statute, it must still determine whether EPA properly applied
38. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 529 F.3d 1077, 1081–83
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that CAA section 112 clearly required a residual
risk standard of 1 in 1,000,000 before finding that EPA’s interpretation was reasonable).
39. New Jersey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
40. See, e.g., Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 30, at 10,377 (92% success rate for EPA
in rulemaking challenges in courts of appeals decided on Chevron step two in the 1990s and a
89% success rate in the 1980s).
41. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 3, 22–27 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(upholding EPA’s decision to alter its definition of emissions increases for New Source Review).
42. 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
43. Id. at 908.
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44

that interpretation when taking final action. As opposed to the
Chevron analysis, which primarily involves pure questions of law,
arbitrary and capricious review is fact-intensive and is based on the
45
administrative record that formed the basis of EPA’s decision. Still,
the standard of review is deferential, and the courts may not
46
substitute their own judgment for that of the agency. So long as
there is evidence in the administrative record to support EPA’s
decision, it will be upheld, even if there is also sufficient evidence to
47
support a different result.
Although arbitrary and capricious review involves a deferential
standard, EPA does not enjoy as great a degree of success in the
48
federal courts under this standard as it does under Chevron step two.
The reason becomes clearer when the bases for petitioners’
challenges are considered in more detail. When a petitioner
challenges the quality of the data relied upon by EPA or suggests that
other data is more persuasive, courts are likely to defer to EPA’s
expertise and uphold the final agency action. For example, in New
York v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit stated “the court must defer to EPA’s
assessment of the environmental benefits of [Plantwide Applicability
Limitations], which is based on the agency’s expert evaluation of
49
technical data from the pilot projects.” In contrast, petitioners tend
to succeed when they can identify data gaps or missing steps in EPA’s
logic that preclude meaningful review of EPA’s decision-making

44. New York, 413 F.3d at 22–31 (reviewing EPA’s decision under an arbitrary and
capricious standard after finding EPA’s interpretation permissible under Chevron).
45. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
(“[R]eview is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the
time he made his decision.”). See also Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 559
F.3d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[S]ubstantive review under CAA mirrors that under APA.”)
(citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 28 F.3d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir.1994)).
46. New York, 413 F.3d at 38.
47. Id. at 31 (“Nor does the fact that ‘the evidence in the record may also support other
conclusions . . . prevent us from concluding that [the agency’s] decisions were rational and
supported by the record.’” (quoting Lead Indus. Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d
1130, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (omission in original)).
48. The Schroeder and Glicksman study found that, among challenges to rulemaking in
the U.S. courts of appeals that were decided under Chevron and reached step two, EPA enjoyed
a 92% success rate in the 1990s and a 89% success rate in the 1980s. Schroeder & Glicksman,
supra note 30, at 10,377. By contrast, EPA’s success rate in cases where U.S. courts of appeals
reviewed agency scientific judgment based on the arbitrary and capricious standard was 78% in
the 1990s and 85% in 1986 through 1987. Id. at 10,392.
49. 413 F.3d at 38.
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50

process. However, a petitioner’s success is relative because, under an
arbitrary and capricious review, the court does not typically express
any opinion regarding the substance of EPA’s decision but instead
51
remands for a better explanation. EPA is not typically prevented
from taking the same action at a later date, after supplementing the
52
administrative record to provide better support.
D. Analysis
EPA’s final actions under the Clean Air Act are commonly
53
challenged in section 307 actions. However, this is not surprising due
to the significance of the issues underlying the suits and EPA’s
position with respect to the petitioners. First, section 307 challenges
involve final agency actions, which have broad, real-world impacts.
As a result, the stakes are generally high for all interested parties.
Second, EPA, along with other government entities, is often
essentially caught in the middle between regulated entities and
environmental NGOs. Given the fundamental disagreements
between these groups, virtually any action by EPA is likely to upset
54
one, if not both, of them. In this context, it may be a greater surprise

50. See, e.g., Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 370 F.3d 1232, 1245
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“While EPA may be able to know that a correlation exists between one
known pollutant and some other unknown pollutants, it has not memorialized that knowledge in
such a fashion that commenters, interested members of the public, regulated entities, and most
importantly, a reviewing court, can assess. We cannot review under any standard the adequacy
of the EPA’s correlation determination if we do not know what correlation the EPA found to
exist.”).
51. See, e.g., Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 323 F.3d 1088, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (asserting an inability to evaluate EPA’s decision due to lack of evidence in the
administrative record).
52. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1320, 1134–35 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (affirming EPA’s PSD rules for nitrogen oxides after remanding the same rule 17 years
earlier).
53. For example EPA faced eight separate challenges to Maximum Achievable Control
Technology standards issued by the Bush Administration. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L., 323 F.3d
at 1088; Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 353 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Mossville Envtl.
Action Now, 370 F.3d at 1232; Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 479 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Natural
Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 529 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Sierra Club v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
54. Indeed, a review of Section 307 petitions against the Bush Administration EPA shows
a fairly balanced mix of petitioners from environmental, industry, and government sectors.
While more petitions were filed by environmental groups than industry representatives, some of
this difference may be attributable to the EPA’s policy choices. Some cases even involve
simultaneous challenges by environmental and industry organizations. See, e.g., Natural Res.
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when EPA is able to take a final action without being challenged
under section 307.
Under section 307, courts remain limited in the remedies that
they can provide to successful petitioners. A court can vacate all or
parts of an EPA action and can remand an action to EPA for further
55
support on the record. However, it may not impose a different
56
action of its own choosing. Nonetheless, federal courts can have a
significant effect on subsequent EPA action by constraining the
substantive and procedural options available to decision makers.
A federal court’s relative power with respect to EPA is at its
apex when the court considers petitions within a Chevron step one
analysis. At this stage, a court has the authority to determine de novo
both the content of Congress’s intent and the meaning of the various
provisions of the Clean Air Act. As a result, it may reject EPA’s
preferred interpretation and dictate the procedures that EPA must
follow when taking subsequent action. In the context of MACT
standards under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, the D.C. Circuit
has rejected EPA interpretations by (1) prohibiting the agency from
considering technical feasibility with respect to retrofitting existing
57
sources within a sector; (2) requiring EPA to set emissions standards
reductions for all sectors, regardless of the practices of the best
58
performers; (3) requiring EPA to regulate incinerators that
59
produced thermal energy as a combustion byproduct; (4) prohibiting
EPA from creating sub-categories of sources for the purpose of
60
excluding them from regulation; and (5) requiring the agency to
apply continuous MACT standards to all sources, even during

Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (EPA’s 8-hour ozone
NAAQS challenged by NRDC and numerous states).
55. See, e.g., North Carolina v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(vacating entire rule); New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(vacating in part); Mossville Envtl. Action Now, 370 F.3d at 1232 (remanding for further
support).
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006) (limiting judicial remedies to “setting aside” agency
actions, findings, and conclusion). See also Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053,
1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that the Clean Air Act’s review provisions are the same as those in
the Administrative Procedure Act).
57. See Sierra Club, 479 F.3d at 880-81.
58. Id. at 883.
59. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1250, 1257–61 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
60. Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1364, 1371–73 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
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61

startup, shutdown, and malfunctions. In each case, the court not only
rejected EPA’s final action, but also placed strict guidelines on all
future EPA action under the same statutory provision. Thus, Chevron
step-one decisions have both substantive and long-ranging impacts on
the agency.
In contrast, a court’s relative power with respect to EPA is
greatly diminished in a Chevron step two analysis. As a practical
matter, the difference can be seen in cases where EPA and the courts
disagree with respect to a statute’s meaning. Under Chevron step one,
a court can, in essence, impose its own preferred interpretation by
finding that Congress’s intent is clear. But under Chevron step two,
the court must defer to any reasonable agency interpretation, even if
it is not “the interpretation that the court might have originally given
62
the statute.” This does not mean that under Chevron step two, a
federal court has no power vis-à-vis the EPA; it merely means that a
63
court acts on the margins in shaping EPA’s statutory obligations.
For example, in North Carolina v. EPA, the court found EPA’s
interpretation unreasonable because it conflicted with another
64
provision of the Clean Air Act. While the court foreclosed EPA’s
preferred interpretation, it still provided EPA with the discretion by
vacating the rule and allowing EPA to reinterpret the statute on its
65
own. Thus, it is not surprising that EPA typically argues for statutory
ambiguity under Chevron step one, since it has a high success rate at
Chevron step two and, even in defeat, retains significant discretion in
how to apply the Clean Air Act in future final actions.
A federal court’s review of agency action under an arbitrary and
capricious standard demonstrates a further limitation of the federal
judiciary’s relative power with respect to EPA. First, the court’s
review under an arbitrary and capricious standard tends to be a fact66
driven analysis based on the administrative record. While EPA may
be able to glean lessons from the court’s analysis, the detailed nature

61. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 551 F.3d 1019, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
62. New Jersey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
63. Some observers have argued that federal courts exercise some inherent flexibility in
applying Chevron. See, e.g., Jonathon T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 87–89 (2000). If so, the federal courts retain the choice to resolve an issue on step
one, where the court’s power is greatest, or to move to step two.
64. North Carolina v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896, 908–11 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 929–30 (vacating permit without dictating proper interpretation of the statute).
66. See, e.g., Bluewater Network v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 370 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
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of the opinions may constrain their impact on future agency decisionmaking. Second, when faced with substantive questions, such as the
weight and credibility of different data and technical reports, courts
tend to take a deferential view that respects EPA’s technical expertise
67
in environmental fields. While courts are more likely to remand final
actions after identifying gaps in the administrative record, these
68
decisions tend to focus only on process rather than substance.
Typically, in such a circumstance, the court will state explicitly that it
is not expressing any judgment on the merits of the final EPA action
and that EPA is free to take the same action again after
69
supplementing the record. While this outcome will impact EPA’s
procedure upon remand, that may be the extent of a decision’s
impact.
Another facet of the federal judiciary’s relative power relates to
EPA’s ability to avoid judicial involvement. First, EPA is a defendant
in section 307 cases and therefore has no discretion to choose whether
or not to involve the courts. And even in the context of threshold
issues, which must be met before a case can be heard on the merits,
the court, and not EPA, remains the final authority in determining
70
whether threshold criteria are met. Further, there is a dearth of case
law addressing settlements or consent decrees in section 307
challenges, suggesting that such resolutions are rare. However, this is
not surprising given the nature of the litigants. As described above,
EPA is essentially caught in the middle between environmental
groups and regulated entities. As a result, a potential settlement may
well result in a new lawsuit from the other side.
In sum, the federal courts have significant power relative to EPA
in section 307 challenges. Not only are the challenges numerous,
involving virtually every significant final action taken by EPA, they
are also substantively important, often addressing key issues of

67. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 3, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the court must defer to EPA’s assessment that is based on the agency’s expert
evaluation of technical data).
68. See, e.g., Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 370 F.3d 1232, 1243
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (remanding rule to EPA for a more adequate explanation rather than
addressing substance of plaintiff’s claim when EPA failed to include sufficient evidence in the
record).
69. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.3d 1320, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(upholding provisions in 2005 EPA implementing PSD for NOX which were identical or nearly
identical to provision in 1988 rule which court found deficient because for the 2005 rule, EPA
provided support and scientific bases which the court had found missing in earlier rule).
70. See supra Part II.B.
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statutory construction. Although a court’s role diminishes through the
course of the review process, moving from Chevron review to the
arbitrary and capricious standard, as a whole it is quite strong.
III. SUITS ALLEGING EPA FAILURE TO ACT
Unlike section 307 challenges, which require a court to address
71
the propriety of final action taken by EPA, section 304 challenges
assert that EPA has failed to take any action at all, despite a nondiscretionary duty to do so. Because no action has been taken, there
is typically far less in the way of agency conclusions and fact-finding
72
for a court to review and fewer, narrower remedies are available.
From a substantive perspective, the courts’ interaction with EPA
during a section 304 challenge is limited to determining (1) whether
EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to act; (2) whether EPA has taken
sufficient steps to satisfy that duty; and (3) when EPA must take the
73
omitted action if it is found liable. In addition, district courts hearing
these actions must address a variety of peripheral issues, which may
not address the merits of a claim but are nonetheless important to the
litigants. These issues include discovery requests, motions to
74
intervene, and requests for attorneys’ fees. Finally, given the courts’
limited substantive authority under section 304, EPA has
considerable discretion to take cases away from courts by admitting
liability, reaching a settlement with the petitioner, or simply taking
75
action to moot the suit.
A. Statutory Background
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act permits citizens’ suits against
the EPA “where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
76
discretionary.” This section also authorizes suits to compel “agency

71. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006).
72. See Sierra Club v. Browner, 130 F. Supp. 2d 78, 90 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Under the CAA,
the Court can only order EPA to take nondiscretionary actions required by the statute itself.”).
73. See infra Sections III.B, C, and D.
74. See supra Part III.E.
75. See supra Part III.F.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2). A similar judicial review process is provided in a number of
other statutory schemes administered by EPA. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2006). In the event that a statutory scheme lacks judicial
review provisions, the APA provides a means to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
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77

action unreasonably delayed.” Unlike challenges to final agency
action which are filed in the courts of appeals, citizens’ suits based on
78
a failure to act must be filed in United States district courts. Before
filing a suit alleging a failure to act, a petitioner must give EPA notice
of its intent to sue and then wait sixty days to permit EPA to take
79
corrective action. This requirement is jurisdictional in nature, and
the action will be dismissed if the party fails to give EPA sufficient
80
pre-suit notice.
B. Jurisdiction of the District Courts
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal district courts lack
authority to hear a case without a specific grant of jurisdiction. Unless
Congress has waived the government’s sovereign immunity, courts
lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases against the federal
81
government, including EPA. Section 304 provides a limited waiver
of sovereign immunity for acts and duties “which [are] not
82
discretionary with the Administrator.” Therefore, a court’s first task
is to determine whether the alleged inaction involves a
nondiscretionary duty imposed by the Clean Air Act. This is an issue
of pure statutory interpretation, and because section 304 describes the
district courts’ jurisdiction rather than EPA’s duties under the Clean
Air Act, the courts need not defer to EPA when determining whether
83
a duty is nondiscretionary.

77. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). When the petition seeks to compel agency action which would be
subject to review under section 307, it must be filed in a district court within the circuit in which
review of the final agency action would occur. Id. Failure to file in a proper district court may
not be fatal, as the court has discretion to transfer the action to a district court with proper
venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006). See also Sierra Club v. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38
(D.D.C. 2009).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
79. Id. § 7604(b)(2).
80. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690–91 (7th Cir. 1975). However, such a
requirement is not as onerous as it may seem because there is no time limit in which a party
must file. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). If an initial action is procedurally ineffective, the party may
simply provide notice and, after 60 days, file suit again if EPA has not begun to take action.
81. Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 355 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (D.D.C. 2005).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2006).
83. Leavitt, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (“[T]he court owes no deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute that defines this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”). In Sierra Club
v. Leavitt, the court found that Section 304 provided jurisdiction with respect to nondiscretionary actions required by EPA regulations as well as non-discretionary actions required
by statute. Id. at 553-557.
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Given the fact that section 304 challenges permit a court to
84
curtail EPA discretion by requiring it to act, one would expect EPA
to challenge courts’ subject matter jurisdiction with some frequency.
That is, when faced with a section 304 challenge, EPA’s best defense
would be that its obligations were actually discretionary. Regardless
of the deference EPA may be afforded with respect to substantive
issues, a successful outcome on jurisdictional grounds would end the
suit completely and give EPA freedom to act only if and when it
chooses.
However, in the past decade there have only been a handful of
opinions addressing the nondiscretionary nature of EPA’s duties
under the Clean Air Act. Indeed, the only subject matter jurisdiction
issues that were litigated addressed whether a date certain is required
85
for a nondiscretionary duty, whether section 304 extends to agency86
issued regulations or only to statutory requirements, and whether a
87
statutory duty to act was implicitly repealed by a subsequent statute.
This suggests either that most significant statutory requirements
under the Clean Air Act have become well defined or that citizens’
suits are only brought with respect to the most clear cases of
nondiscretionary duties.
C. Was There a Failure to Act?
The second substantive issue that a district court must address is
whether EPA has failed to act. However, this issue is rarely litigated.
Unlike the jurisdictional issue above, determination of what
88
constitutes sufficient action involves a degree of deference to EPA.
The issue typically arises when EPA has taken some action with
respect to a nondiscretionary duty, but the plaintiffs challenge its
sufficiency. For example, in Sierra Club v. Johnson, plaintiffs alleged
that, after receiving a Title V permit application from a waste
89
incinerator, EPA had failed to issue or deny the permit. EPA
asserted that it had taken sufficient action by “initiating the process to
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
85. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d 936, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
86. Leavitt, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
87. Envtl. Def. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 06-4273, 2007 WL 127998, at *3-4 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 12, 2007).
88. Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Johnson, 400 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2005)
(“[W]hile a healthy respect may be given to an agency’s position on whether its actions are
‘final,’ the court must ultimately satisfy for itself that the agency’s actions are or are not indeed
‘final.’”).
89. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 938.
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90

issue or deny a Title V permit” for the applicant. The district court
rejected EPA’s assertion, finding that EPA’s nondiscretionary duty
91
required it to actually grant or deny the permit. Thus, the district
court engages in limited statutory interpretation by determining what
is required for final agency action with respect to a nondiscretionary
duty.
When EPA has taken some action, the interplay between
sections 307 and 304 becomes an important issue in determining when
and where a petitioner can file a citizens’ suit against EPA. As
described above, courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over
suits challenging the substance of a final agency action, and such suits
92
must be brought within sixty days of the final action taking place.
Thus, if EPA is successful in asserting that its actions were sufficient
to constitute final agency action, a plaintiff is without remedy in
district court, and a subsequent challenge in the court of appeals may
93
well be time-barred. However, if EPA’s actions are not sufficient to
constitute a final agency action, a plaintiff can not only bring a
successful suit under section 304, but will also have an opportunity to
bring a subsequent section 307 challenge if it is dissatisfied with
EPA’s final action. In addition, if a final agency action is vacated by a
court of appeals under section 307, EPA will again be subject to suits
94
under section 304 if it fails to respond to the court’s remand.
D. Remedy—Timing for Final Agency Action
In cases directly addressing the merits of section 304 challenges
alleging EPA inaction, one of the most commonly litigated issues is

90. Id. at 939.
91. Id. at 940 (“Until the Title V permit is issued or denied, there is a case or
controversy.”).
92. See supra Part II.A.
93. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 43. After plaintiffs filed suit alleging
that EPA failed to promulgate emissions standards for coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam
generating units, EPA issued a final rule delisting the units as a hazardous source category
which mooted the case. Id. at 41–42. The district court said that it lacked authority to determine
whether EPA had followed the proper procedures in delisting the units because it would
constitute review of a final agency action which was reserved for the courts of appeal. Id. at 43–
44. While the court suggested that plaintiffs could challenge EPA’s action in the courts of
appeals, id. at 44, it is questionable because the district court issued its decision nearly seven
months after EPA delisted the source and well in excess of the 60 day limit on challenging final
agency actions. Id.
94. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 373 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32–33 (D.D.C. 2005) (“EPA’s duty to act is
still (or again) unfulfilled, because the Court of Appeals’ order vacating EPA’s conditional
approval of the pre-2001 SIPs . . . operated to restore the status quo ante.”).
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the remedy—the date by which EPA must take final action. In fact, it
95
is extremely common for EPA to admit liability for failure to act.
These cases entail disagreements between plaintiffs, who seek quick
agency action, and EPA, which claims that it cannot take effective
96
action for months or even years. Courts are placed in a delicate
position when devising an appropriate remedy under section 304. On
one hand, these cases often entail statutory deadlines that have been
97
missed by years, if not decades, making plaintiffs’ requests for
prompt action reasonable. But on the other hand, sound and effective
regulations take time to develop, especially when EPA’s limited
resources are considered. Setting too short a time period can either
result in ineffective regulations or missed deadlines and additional
98
judicial involvement. District courts often use the parties’ proposals
as starting points and try to find a middle ground that ensures quick
action yet respects EPA’s valid need for sufficient time to issue
99
regulations.
Despite their appearance as significant controls over EPA,
injunctions directing EPA to act by a date certain are not necessarily
successful in achieving the desired result. The record is replete with
cases involving multiple rounds of litigation under section 304,
suggesting that an injunction to act at a later date may be insufficient
to compel agency action if failure to meet the deadline merely results
in another injunction with a later deadline. EPA’s rulemaking process
with respect to section 112(g) Maximum Achievable Control
Technology (“MACT”) regulations for several sources of industrial

95. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d 46, 52 (D.D.C. 2006) (“There is no
question as to liability; EPA does not contest its failure to discharge its duty under the
statute.”); Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 07-3678, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 5, 2008); Mo. Coal. for the Env’t v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 04-CV-660, 2005 WL
2234579, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005); Med. Advocates for Healthy Air v. Whitman, No. 0205102, 2003 WL 926997, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003) (“EPA does not dispute that it has a
mandatory duty to promulgate a FIP . . . .”).
96. See, e.g., Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d. at 55 (describing EPA assertion that it needed
additional time to ensure regulations will withstand judicial review); Med. Advocates for Healthy
Air, 2003 WL 926997, at *2 (describing EPA assertion that it needs additional time due to
“complexity of the issue and the quantity of data that must be gathered”).
97. See, e.g., Mo. Coal. for the Env’t, 2005 WL 2234579, at *1–2 (noting that EPA had
never reviewed the lead NAAQS despite a nondiscretionary duty to do so 22 years prior to the
decision).
98. Challenges to EPA’s Boiler MACT rulemaking, which are discussed below, provide an
excellent case in point.
99. See, e.g., Mo. Coal. for the Env’t, 2005 WL 2234579, at *3 (granting EPA 3.5 years to
complete review of lead NAAQS after plaintiff and defendant asked for 1.5 and 4.5 years
respectively).
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boilers (“Boiler MACT”) provides an excellent case study. Sierra
Club initiated litigation by filing seven section 304 complaints against
100
EPA in 2001. The parties subsequently agreed to a consent decree
in 2003, which set a new schedule for EPA compliance with various
101
statutory deadlines. The parties were unable to reach agreement on
102
other deadlines, which were subsequently set by the court. EPA
then filed several unopposed motions for extensions of the deadlines,
103
which were granted. However, EPA still failed to meet the
deadlines, and Sierra Club finally opposed EPA’s request for further
104
extensions of up to fifteen months. After reviewing the extensive
delays in the case and apparently expressing increased frustration
with EPA’s failure to comply with its deadlines, the court granted
105
EPA only one additional month’s extension.
Although EPA
responded to the court’s decision by promulgating final MACT
106
rules,
it simultaneously issued a notice stating its intent to
107
reconsider the rules. Regardless of the merits of EPA’s claims that
it needed additional time, the long and repetitive history of this case
demonstrates that injunctions directing EPA to act by a future
deadline can be of limited utility. Faced with EPA’s subsequent
failure to act, the courts may believe they have little recourse but to
set another compliance date and hope that EPA will cooperate.
E. Peripheral Issues
In addition to the merits-based decisions discussed above, it is
also common for district courts to address a number of peripheral
issues which do not relate directly to the substance of the parties’
claims. Among the peripheral issues are discovery motions, motions
to intervene, and petitions for attorneys’ fees. Perhaps the most
important issue is petitions for attorneys’ fees. Section 304(d) permits
such fees to be awarded “whenever the court deems such an award is
108
appropriate.” Courts interpreting the attorneys’ fees provisions of

100. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 61.
103. Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 01-1537, 2011 WL 181097, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2011).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *14.
106. 76 Fed. Reg. 15,608 (Mar. 21, 2011).
107. 76 Fed. Reg. 15,266 (Mar. 21, 2011). In addition, EPA stayed the effective date of the
rule, pending the completion of its reconsideration. 76 Fed. Reg. 28,662, 28,663 (May 18, 2011).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006).
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the Clean Air Act continue to endorse a catalyst theory of identifying
109
prevailing parties in section 304 cases, so plaintiffs may be entitled
to attorneys’ fees even if a settlement or consent decree prevents a
110
judgment on the merits.
Despite its peripheral nature, the courts’ willingness to award
attorneys’ fees, especially in the context of the catalyst theory, may
play a significant role in the frequency with which section 304 claims
are brought. Given the typically lengthy delay in obtaining final
agency action and the uncertainty as to whether that action will be
favorable, potential petitioners might be wary of investing heavily in
section 304 cases. However, the promise of attorneys’ fees, coupled
with the probability of recovery provided by the catalyst theory, may
encourage otherwise wary petitioners to take on particularly strong
cases. And for frequent section 304 plaintiffs such as Sierra Club, the
availability of attorneys’ fees may provide a constant source of
litigation funds, which enable a steady stream of citizens’ suits against
EPA. Thus, a court’s position with respect to attorneys’ fees may well
ensure a continued relationship with EPA.
F. Ending the Case or Controversy
While the courts’ approach to attorneys’ fees under section 304
may encourage additional interaction with EPA, EPA also has the
ability to take cases away from the courts. First, EPA can render a
case or controversy moot at any time by simply completing the action
111
that was allegedly lacking. Because a section 304 case alleges only a
failure to act—and does not include any allegation regarding the

109. Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Although
Buckhannon rejected the catalyst theory, the statute at issue there authorizes fee awards only to
‘prevailing part[ies].’ By comparison, Ruckelshaus’s footnote eight analysis directly applies to
the issue here, as it interprets section 307(f) to authorize fee awards for ‘suits that forced
defendants to abandon illegal conduct, although without a formal court order.’ [Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club,] 463 U.S. [680,] 686 n.8 [(1983).]”). The Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus further
clarified that “whatever general standard may apply under § 304(f), a similar standard applies
under § 304(d).” Id. at 691.
110. As described below, settlement agreements and consent decrees are common in
section 304 actions. It is possible that the availability of attorneys’ fees creates an incentive for
EPA to settle Section 304 cases, either to limit such fees or to exclude them as a condition of the
agreement.
111. Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Johnson, 400 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D.D.C. 2005)
(declaring plaintiffs’ claims moot when EPA took final action nearly a year after plaintiffs filed
suit).
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substance of that act—action by EPA ends the case, regardless of
112
whether the plaintiff supports the final result.
Even in cases where EPA would be unable to take a final action
before the conclusion of a case, it can either enter into a settlement
agreement or a consent decree, which largely takes the case out of the
113
court’s hands. Given EPA’s apparent willingness to admit liability
114
for failure to act, it seems that the critical issue in settling cases
without judicial involvement is the issue of timing. So long as the
parties can agree to a timeframe on which EPA must act, there is no
reason not to enter into a settlement. Moreover, a settlement
agreement or consent decree may give plaintiffs more leverage with
respect to the content of the future agency action—something that a
115
district court simply cannot offer them. In light of the benefits that
can potentially accrue to both EPA and petitioners by settling a
section 304 case, it is not surprising that such settlements present a
116
viable alternative to judicial resolution. Indeed, after the parties
have reached an agreement, it is common for a court to become
involved only as a result of would-be intervenors’ objections or
117
petitions for attorneys’ fees.
G. Analysis
When compared to section 307 petitions, section 304 petitions
118
appear to be somewhat rare. Thus, in a purely numerical sense, the

112. Id. at 43 (“While jurisdiction to determine the finality of the EPA’s action clearly lies
with the court and has been exercised here, any consideration of the propriety of an agency’s
action necessarily goes to the merits of those actions. The merits of those actions are exclusively
reserved under the CAA for the courts of appeals.”).
113. Am. Nurses Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 08-2198, 2010 WL 1506913, at *1 (D.D.C. April 15,
2010) (“A consent decree is not a court ‘order,’ and by entering this consent decree the Court is
only accepting the parties’ agreement to settle, not adjudicating whether EPA’s legal position is
correct.”).
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d 46, 60 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Under the CAA, the
Court can only order EPA to take nondiscretionary actions required by the statute itself. . . .
Notably, the CAA does not allow district courts to address the content of EPA’s conduct, issue
substantive determinations of its own, or grant other forms of declaratory relief.”).
116. For example, as described in Section III.D, supra, timing is one of the most contentious
issues in § 304 actions and, if agreement is possible, both sides may prefer a negotiated timeline
for rulemaking than a schedule dictated by a court.
117. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55 (2004) (D.D.C. 2004) (intervenor’s
objections); Desert Rock Energy Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 08-872, 2009 WL 3247312
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009) (petition for attorneys’ fees).
118. Although we are unaware of any comprehensive analyses of the number of petitions
filed under sections 307 and 304 our own research of petitions in response actions (or inaction)
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courts have less impact on EPA in this area. Several factors may
contribute to this difference. First, the stakes in section 304 challenges
are not as high for petitioners because, by definition, EPA’s failure to
act cannot establish substantive rules that are binding on regulated
entities and affect the public as a whole. Second, many of the required
actions, such as responses to permit applications, may impact fewer
people and therefore create a smaller pool of potential petitioners.
Finally, as described more fully below, EPA can resolve section 304
challenges prior to court intervention, and many potential challenges
may simply be resolved before the court has an opportunity to act.
While the availability of attorneys’ fees creates an incentive to bring
section 304 petitions, that factor may not be enough to encourage
litigation except in the most significant of cases.
When compared to section 307, a court’s relative power in
section 304 cases is also greatly diminished with respect to substance
and remedies. As one court noted, “the [Clean Air Act] does not
allow district courts to address the content of EPA’s conduct, issue
substantive determinations of its own, or grant other forms of
declaratory relief . . . [u]nder 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) such substantive
judicial relief is expressly reserved for the appropriate court of
119
appeals.” Instead, a district court “can only order EPA to take
120
nondiscretionary actions required by the statute itself.” Aside from
the rare jurisdictional questions, which require the court to determine
whether a duty is nondiscretionary or whether EPA has failed to take
sufficient action, the majority of merits-based decisions involve factspecific inquiries into the appropriate timing for subsequent agency
action. Other peripheral issues, such as motions for discovery,
motions to intervene, and petitions for attorneys’ fees may impact the
EPA in terms of time and resources but have little effect on the shape
of subsequent regulations. Even the injunctive power to compel the
courts to act at a later date is limited because there is little a court can
do to ensure that EPA complies with the remedy, short of exercising
121
the contempt power.
Finally, a court’s power is limited by the fact that EPA can take
cases away from it through settlement or simply by taking action. As

of the EPA during the Bush Administration (2001-2009) revealed a significantly greater number
of petitions filed under section 307.
119. Johnson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
120. Id.
121. Indeed, an effort to punish EPA through sanctions could be counterproductive as it
would create further strain on EPA’s resources and limit its ability to issue new regulations.
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in section 307 cases, EPA is a defendant in section 304 cases and is
forced to participate in the action. However, in section 304 cases, it is
common for EPA to resolve the dispute without judicial involvement
122
through a stipulated dismissal or consent decree. As a result, there
is no guarantee that a court will resolve a petition once it is filed. But
even when one side favors delay, it simply may not be credible to
assert that EPA has no obligation to act. As a result, there are fewer
barriers to settlement and a smaller likelihood that a court will be
called upon to resolve substantive issues related to the suit.
IV. CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
In the realm of Clean Air Act enforcement, the pattern
described above, with respect to challenges to agency action and
agency inaction, is inverted. EPA chooses the means of enforcement
123
and initiates that process against another (usually private) entity —
in contrast to suits challenging EPA action or inaction, where the
initial choice to appear in court is not in EPA’s hands. In addition,
EPA is not the only entity which may enforce the strictures and
implementing regulations of the Clean Air Act. Broadly speaking, the
Act authorizes three categories of entities to enforce its strictures: (1)
the federal government, through EPA and/or the Department of
Justice and its instrumentalities; (2) state and local governments with
programs and authority delegated to them by EPA; and (3) the
124
public, through citizens’ suits. However, it is primarily EPA and the
Department of Justice—or their state, local, or tribal enforcement
counterparts—that initiate enforcement and thereby retain
125
substantial discretion as to the form of the enforcement. As with
challenges to agency action and inaction, the role of the federal
judiciary in enforcing the regulatory regime created by the Clean Air
Act varies. The role of a court is at its apex in this area when
enforcement is pursued by EPA and the Department of Justice via a

122. See, e.g., Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 55; Am. Nurses Ass’n v. Jackson, No. 08-2198, 2010
WL 1506913 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2010).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (2006) (CAA grants EPA choice of enforcement
mechanisms against “any person” for violations of applicable plans or permits); id. § 7413(a)(3)
(EPA has choice of enforcement mechanisms for violations of other CAA requirements); see
also id. § 7413(a)(2) (in case of state failure to adequately enforce plan or permit, EPA is given
choice of means to enforce “such plan or permit. . . against any person”); id. § 7413(a)(5).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (EPA); id. §§ 7413(a)(3)(D), (c) (U.S. Department of Justice); id.
§ 7416 (state enforcement); id. § 7604 (authorization for citizens’ suits).
125. See infra Section IV.E (discussing primacy of federal and state enforcement under the
CAA).
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civil suit or criminal indictment or is pursued by citizens via the
126
citizens’ suit provision.
Even then, however, the federal judiciary’s reach is narrowed
substantially, as a practical matter, due to several factors. The first is
the predominance of administrative enforcement. EPA statistics
reveal that the bulk of federal and state environmental enforcement is
accomplished through administrative procedures and settlements, as
opposed to civil or criminal judicial suits or dispositions on the merits.
The second factor is the predominance of settlement in resolving
enforcement suits. This is reflected, in part, in statistics which show
that few civil suits result in judicial resolution. The third factor is the
states’ large role in enforcement. Far more Clean Air Act civil
enforcement is conducted by state, rather than federal, agencies. The
final factor is the ability of federal or state enforcement (or even
some violators) to preempt citizens’ suits.
A. Federal Enforcement—Administrative and Judicial Options
The federal government has a number of enforcement tools
under the Act, including administrative compliance orders,
administrative penalty orders, civil judicial enforcement actions, and
criminal actions. Under Clean Air Act (“CAA”) section 113(a)(1),
“[w]henever . . . [EPA] finds that any person has violated or is in
violation of any requirement or prohibition of an applicable
implementation plan or permit,” the agency is authorized to
127
undertake enforcement. The agency first must issue a notice of
violation (NOV) to the alleged violator, copying the relevant state,
128
local, or tribal authority if applicable. Thirty days after issuance of
the NOV, EPA is authorized to take one of several enforcement
129
actions.
1. Administrative Compliance Order
First, the agency may issue an administrative compliance order
or corrective action order—“an order requiring such person to
comply with the requirements or prohibitions of such plan or

126. See infra Section IV.C (contrasting the role of the judiciary in original enforcement
actions brought in federal courts with the more limited judicial role in judicial review of
administrative actions).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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130

permit.” Such compliance orders expressly do not preclude further
state or federal administrative or judicial enforcement for the alleged
131
noncompliance. The administrative compliance order acts as an
injunction, which, although not directly imposing penalties, can be the
basis for a later EPA administrative penalty or civil suit to enforce
132
compliance—and seek penalties for noncompliance—with its terms.
A variation on the administrative compliance order is
authorized, as part of the emergency response provisions, where EPA
makes a determination that pollution emissions or releases are
causing imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
persons, human welfare, or the environment, and where a civil suit is
133
impracticable. Similar, but broader, remedies are authorized in
response to releases and threatened releases of listed hazardous
134
substances.
2. Administrative Penalty Order
135

Second, separately or in combination with an administrative
compliance order, EPA may pursue an administrative penalty order
136
for penalties up to a statutory limit—which is $25,000 per day per
137
violation for most violations. Absent a joint determination between
138
the Department of Justice and the EPA, total penalties under such
an order may not exceed $200,000 and may only apply where the first
139
alleged violation occurred within the previous twelve months.

130. Id. § 7413(a)(1)(A).
131. Id. § 7413(a)(4), (5).
132. See id. §§ 7413(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(B), (5)(A) (authorizing EPA to issue orders
requiring compliance with requirements and prohibitions of CAA and related federal and state
laws); id. § 7413(a)(3)(A), (C) (authorizing administrative penalty orders and civil actions to
redress violations of, inter alia, orders issued under authority of this subchapter of CAA). See
also id. § 7413(d)(1)(B) (administrative penalty order authorized for violation of orders issued
under authority of CAA).
133. Id. § 7603.
134. See id. § 7412(r)(9).
135. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.1 (2010).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2010). This and other maximum
penalty figures discussed in this article represent the statutory maxima. However, these penalty
limits have been adjusted upward by regulation, pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990, to account for inflation.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1)(B), (d); see also id. § 7524(a), (c).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Although this twelve month requirement may be waived,
administrative penalty actions likely must still be initiated within five years of when the
underlying violation first accrued, possibly unless it is a continuing violation.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1).
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Subjects of such a penalty order must be given written notice in
the form of an administrative complaint and are entitled to due
process, if requested within thirty days of such notice, in the form of
140
an administrative hearing on the record. Administrative penalty
orders are subject to the general administrative hearings procedures
141
contained in EPA’s Part 22 implementing regulations. Under those
Part 22 regulations, the decision of the administrative law judge
becomes a final order within forty-five days of initial decision, unless
the subject of the penalty order appeals the order to EPA’s
142
Environmental Appeals Board or moves to reopen the matter.
3. Civil Action—Civil Judicial Enforcement
Third, EPA may ask the Department of Justice to bring a civil
action in district court for permanent or temporary injunctive relief,
143
or for civil penalties of $25,000 per day per violation against owners
and operators of stationary sources and other persons who have
violated or are violating provisions of the Clean Air Act, its
144
implementing regulations, or any applicable implementation plan.
Civil suits for injunctive relief or penalties is also authorized as part of
an emergency response, when EPA makes a determination that the
pollution is causing imminent and substantial endangerment to the
145
health of persons, human welfare, or the environment, and in
response to releases or threatened releases of listed hazardous
146
substances.
4. Criminal Judicial Enforcement
Fourth, the Department of Justice is also authorized to seek
criminal penalties as part of a criminal enforcement suit in district
court for knowing violations of Clean Air Act requirements, including
applicable implementation plans and recordkeeping, monitoring, and
reporting requirements; for negligent releases of listed hazardous
substances which place another person in imminent danger of death
140. Id. § 7413(d)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 22.21(b) (2010). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7524(c)(1).
141. 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.1–22.34 (2010).
142. Id. § 22.27(c)(1)–(4). Another form of an administrative penalty order contemplated
by the Clean Air Act is the field citation, similar to other administrative penalty orders but
limited to penalties of $5,000 per day per violation and offering those subject to an order more
limited due process rights. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3); see also id. at § 7524(c)(1) (Title II).
143. See supra note 136.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1)(C), (b); see also id. § 7524(b).
145. Id. § 7603.
146. Id. § 7412(r)(9).
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or serious bodily injury; and for knowing releases of such listed
147
hazardous substances. Criminal penalties may also be obtained by a
148
criminal suit authorized under the emergency response provisions,
as well as under Title 18 of the U.S. Code for general crimes such as
making false statements to federal officials, including EPA, or for
conspiring to violate federal law, like the Clean Air Act.
5. Settlements
Fifth, EPA and/or the U.S. Department of Justice may also
obtain compliance and penalties through settlement—typically in the
149
form of a consent decree, consent agreement, or consent order. Of
course, settlement is not an exclusive remedy but rather a parallel
procedure and potential alternative outcome with respect to any
other enforcement mechanism, administrative or judicial. Settlement
discussions may be conducted informally or as part of structured
mediation or other alternative dispute resolution processes of varying
structure and formality. However, there are formal requirements that
apply to proposed settlements. The Clean Air Act requires that such
settlements be noticed in the Federal Register and open for public
comment at least thirty days prior to the date on which the settlement
150
or consent decree is final.
Also, and in parallel with the statutory factors that Congress has
provided to courts in setting penalties for violations of the Clean Air
151
Act, EPA has provided guidance to its own staff as to the

147. Id. §§ 7413(a)(3)(D), (c) & 7412(r)(9).
148. Id. § 7603(b).
149. For example, EPA’s Part 22 regulations provide guidance on settlement and its legal
impact where administrative enforcement has already been initiated, and require that the terms
of any such settlement be recorded in a consent agreement. See 40 C.F.R. § 22.18(b) (2010).
When the settlement occurs after the filing of a civil enforcement suit, the terms of the
settlement may be recorded in a consent decree or consent order. See, e.g., List of Proposed
Consent Decrees, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/enrd/Consent_Decrees.html
(last updated Oct. 2011). See also Kevin A. Ewing & Jason B. Hutt, Enforcement and Liability,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 71, 89–90, 95 (Christopher L. Bell et al. eds., 20th ed.,
2009) (describing consent order as voluntary agreement between EPA and regulated entity and
EPA’s use of discretion to pursue enforcement against some alleged violators while settling with
others).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g). See also 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2010) (Department of Justice regulation
providing for a public comment on consent decrees).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e).
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qualitative factors to consider in setting administrative penalties and
152
in conducting settlement negotiations.
B. Federal Administrative Enforcement Dominates
Despite the mix of administrative and judicial enforcement tools
available to EPA, the agency’s enforcement figures demonstrate that
the bulk of its enforcement is accomplished through administrative
orders. Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2010, the final period
for which statistics are currently available, EPA filed between 375
and 600 administrative penalty order complaints per year and
achieved a similar range of final administrative penalty orders,
153
relating exclusively to Clean Air Act enforcement. On top of that,
in the same period EPA issued between 109 and 187 administrative
compliance orders per year solely for alleged Clean Air Act
154
violations.
In that period, EPA enforcement of air-related violations
through civil suit was nearly an order of magnitude smaller; in fact, in
the same period, EPA issued only between sixty-four and eighty-six
155
civil judicial referrals per year. However, even those numbers
substantially overstate the role of civil judicial enforcement in EPA’s
resolution of alleged Clean Air Act violations, as most such suits will
ultimately be resolved by settlement before a final judgment of a
court. This fact is reflected in the figures, smaller still, for civil judicial
conclusions to EPA’s air-related civil enforcement—between twenty

152. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN AIR ACT STATIONARY SOURCE CIVIL
PENALTY POLICY (1991), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/
caa/stationary/penpol.pdf.
153. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY ORDER COMPLAINTS, at E-1b (2011) [hereinafter NETS:
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY ORDER COMPLAINTS], available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e1-apocomplaints.pdf. See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS: FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY ORDERS
(FAPOS), at E-5b (2011) [hereinafter NETS: FAPOS], available at http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e5-fapos.pdf . These numbers exclude
multi-program penalty orders—which, aside from unique circumstances in 2006, are made in
small numbers, usually between 10 and 20 per year. See NETS: ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY
ORDER COMPLAINTS, supra, at E-1b (including metadata); NETS: FAPOS, supra, at E-5b
(including metadata).
154. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLIANCE ORDERS (ACOS), at E-4b (2011) [hereinafter NETS: ACOS],
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e4-acos.pdf.
155. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS: CIVIL
JUDICIAL REFERRALS, at E-2b (2011) [hereinafter NETS: CIVIL JUDICIAL REFERRALS],
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e2-referrals.pdf.
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and thirty-nine suits per year from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year
156
2010. EPA does not provide criminal case statistics allocated by
statute, but the global statistics it does provide confirm that criminal
cases represent a fraction of the number of enforcement actions it
157
takes, roughly equivalent to civil enforcement suits.
This may reflect the heavy burden associated with enforcement
through litigation. These cases require an up-front investment in time
and resources, which may render them less cost-effective overall than
administrative remedies. Furthermore, while the heavy penalties
associated with civil suits may induce compliance from an alleged
violator, enforcement through federal litigation generally will take
longer to resolve an alleged violation than will the “more
158
streamlined” administrative enforcement process. Further, EPA
retains some flexibility if it elects to pursue initial violations
administratively, as that does not close the door to a civil or criminal
suit later on if violations are serious and ongoing. Consequently, it
often may be prudent for EPA to begin with administrative tools and
then proceed to a full-blown complaint in federal court for
particularly serious cases where compliance is not forthcoming.
A corollary of this inference is that EPA’s selection of a judicial
enforcement mechanism, civil or criminal, will indicate that EPA
views the alleged violation or violations as relatively more severe
compared to cases in which it chooses an administrative method. One
conclusion, then, is that while most enforcement is conducted through
administrative proceedings, the alleged violations which are enforced
through the courts are the most serious ones, therefore lending the
156. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS: CIVIL
JUDICIAL CONCLUSIONS, at E-7b (2011) [hereinafter NETS: CIVIL JUDICIAL CONCLUSIONS],
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e7-civjudconcl.pdf.
157. For example, between 2005 and 2009, between 305 and 387 criminal environmental
cases were opened and between 176 and 320 defendants were charged. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS: CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT FINES AND
RESTITUTION, at E-3b (2011) [hereinafter NETS: CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT], available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e3-criminalpenandprogramact.pdf .
In that same period, EPA had between 259 and 286 civil judicial referrals per year. See NETS:
CIVIL JUDICIAL REFERRALS, supra note 155, at E-2b.
158. In the Agency’s guidance as to the circumstances in which administrative enforcement
or civil judicial enforcement should be chosen, EPA observes that “[t]he administrative forum
will provide a more streamlined enforcement option, suitable for addressing many violations[,]”
but that considerations such as a large penalty, severe or repeat violations, and/or need for
ongoing supervision of an injunctive remedy would counsel in favor of judicial enforcement.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA GUIDANCE ON CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE FORUM IN
CLEAN AIR ACT STATIONARY SOURCE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (1991), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/caa/stationary/caaforum-guid.pdf.
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federal courts a substantial role in resolving the most egregious
threats to human health and welfare, if a lesser role in enforcement
generally.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the cases presenting the most
difficult questions of statutory interpretation or those for which
EPA’s factual support is the thinnest—that is, the cases offering
federal courts the greatest opportunity to shape current and future
enforcement—are those likely to be selected, at least initially, for
judicial enforcement. Federal courts may still have an opportunity to
review such cases on appeal of administrative enforcement orders,
but, as discussed below, they must do so based on a deferential
standard of review.
C. The Role of the Federal Courts in Federal Clean Air Act
Enforcement
Aside from challenges to agency action, as discussed above, the
federal judiciary’s role in shaping the contours of the air pollution
control legal regime is at its broadest in those instances where EPA
seeks to enforce Clean Air Act requirements through a civil suit or
criminal indictment in federal district court. The federal court, in such
instances, assumes the traditional trial court role as finder of fact and
interpreter of law.
With respect to administrative enforcement, the Clean Air Act
also provides a role for federal courts, both to enforce compliance
with administrative enforcement orders and to review the legality of
such orders. Yet in these situations, the court’s role is relatively
narrow. Regarding enforcement of compliance with administrative
orders, EPA may ask the Department of Justice to file a civil suit in a
federal district to enforce the failure to pay or otherwise comply with
159
an administrative penalty order. However, the court in such a case
has no jurisdiction to review “the validity, amount, and
160
appropriateness of such order or assessment” and therefore has no
ability to substantively constrain EPA action. Moreover, the Clean
Air Act provides a strong disincentive for noncompliance that would
trigger such a civil enforcement suit, as the statute imposes on the
alleged violator penalty interest—a quarterly nonpayment penalty of

159. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5) (2006); see also id. § 7524(c)(6).
160. Id. § 7413(d)(5).
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ten percent of the outstanding penalty total—as well as attorneys’
161
fees and the litigation expenses of prosecuting the suit.
With respect to the latter mechanism for federal court
involvement in administrative enforcement, the subject of an
administrative enforcement order generally may seek review of such
162
action in federal district court. The Clean Air Act provides
jurisdiction for a federal district court to review the merits of the
administrative penalty order where the subject of that order files suit
after meeting specified prerequisites, including filing within thirty
days of the date on which the penalty order becomes final or a final
163
decision is rendered after an administrative hearing. A suit for
federal district court review is available once the agency issues a final
order after the conclusion of the administrative hearing process,
164
including an appeal to the Environmental Appeals Board, if any.
However, as with enforcement of an administrative order, the court’s
role in reviewing that order is limited and deferential to the agency.
The Clean Air Act provides that the court may vacate or remand an
order or assessment only where “there is not substantial evidence in
the record, taken as a whole, to support the finding of a violation or
unless the order or penalty assessment constitutes an abuse of
165
discretion.”
D. Federalism and Enforcement
Although statistics, as discussed above, show that most federal
enforcement is conducted through administrative means and that
most civil suits which are filed do not terminate in judicial resolution,
those figures do not present the full picture and may overstate the
role of the federal courts in Clean Air Act enforcement. An
examination of the federalism dimension to enforcement under the
Act reveals that state enforcement is far more frequent than federal
enforcement, although the proportions of state enforcement
conducted through administrative mechanisms, settlement, or final

161. Id.
162. The availability of direct federal district court review of administrative compliance
orders—as opposed to administrative penalty orders – is considerably murkier. See generally
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). Consideration of this issue is
outside the scope of this article.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4); see also id. § 7524(c)(5).
164. 40 C.F.R. § 22.31(a) (2010).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d).
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resolution in a state court, as opposed to resolution in a federal court,
are unclear.
166
In line with the cooperative federalism embodied in the Act,
and given the substantial role of states and some local entities in
issuing, monitoring, and managing Clean Air Act permits, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Act also grants these entities a
167
significant role in enforcement. Indeed, in the section describing the
“Congressional findings and declaration of purpose” for the Clean
Air Act, “Congress finds . . . that air pollution prevention . . . and air
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States
168
and local governments.”
States, like EPA, may enforce the
requirements of federal law and state implementation plans even for
alleged violations occurring in state, local, and tribal jurisdictions with
169
delegated permitting and enforcement authority, and, in fact, states
are required to possess authority under state law to enforce those
170
requirements.
Indeed, according to statistics collected by EPA, the lion’s share
of Clean Air Act enforcement is conducted on the state level. For
example, EPA reports that, in 2009 (the most recent year for which
data is currently available), states issued formal administrative or
judicial enforcement actions against 2,183 facilities, while EPA itself
171
issued such actions against only 170 facilities. Figures for 2008 are
similar; in that year, states issued formal enforcement actions against
172
2031 facilities and EPA against 223 facilities. While these figures do
not permit an apples-to-apples comparison to the federal
administrative and judicial enforcement figures discussed above, they
confirm the much larger role—relative to EPA—that state agencies
take in Clean Air Act enforcement.
166. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The
Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006).
167. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
168. Id. § 7401(a)(3).
169. See id. § 7413(a).
170. In general, the Clean Air Act requires state enforcement authority under state law as a
concomitant of the delegation of implementing authority in the form of a state implementation
plan. See, e.g., id. §§ 7410, 7661a(b)(5)(e); 40 C.F.R. 70.11(a) (2010).
171. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, 2009 STATE SUMMARY DATA FOR CLEAN AIR ACT COMBINED 8 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/performance/caa/caa-combined-2009.pdf.
172. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, 2008 CAA TOTAL FACILITIES—COMPILATION OF EVALUATIONS, VIOLATIONS AND
ENFORCEMENT
REPORTED
TO
EPA
DATABASES FOR CAA,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/data/results/performance/caa/2008-caa-combined.pdf.
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The predominance of state enforcement likely impacts not only
EPA’s role in enforcement but also that of the federal courts. To
begin with, while state action against an alleged violation does not
173
always preclude simultaneous EPA enforcement, simultaneous
enforcement for the same violation is not likely to occur frequently.
Thus, while the predominance of state enforcement may not always
limit EPA’s enforcement discretion as a legal matter, it may have that
result as a practical matter.
The predominance of state enforcement likely also reduces the
role of the federal courts in Clean Air Act enforcement. Their role is
limited by two factors: (1) the availability of administrative remedies
under state law and (2) the availability of state courts as alternate
venue to federal courts with respect to enforcement suits. EPA’s
enforcement compliance results reports do not indicate what portion
of state enforcement activity is administrative enforcement or what
portion of state judicial enforcement is filed in state, rather than
federal, courts. Nevertheless, it is likely that state administrative
enforcement offers the same advantages, on average, over state
judicial enforcement that are evident in the case of federal
enforcement—greater speed, lower expense and other resource costs,
and more flexibility. Thus, administrative enforcement is also likely to
be a more popular choice for state enforcement. At the same time,
where state enforcement takes the form of a judicial suit, there is
likely to be a preference for state courts over federal district courts,
given the greater flexibility and other advantages for resolution of
174
state enforcement through those courts. The availability of these

173. The language of Section 113 does not expressly bar EPA from initiating enforcement
against a violator already subject to state enforcement, see 42 U.S.C. 7413(a), and there is case
law support for the premise that a state consent order or pending state enforcement action may
not bar EPA from initiating enforcement against the same violation. See, e.g., United States v.
Ford Motor Co., 814 F.2d 1099, 1101 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that state court order invalidating
portions of approved state implementation plan does not preclude federal enforcement of
same); cf. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 720, 722 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
(conceding a federal agency should defer to a state’s interpretation of an air pollution control
plan, so long as such interpretation is consistent with the Clean Air Act); United States v. AM
Gen. Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (EPA not required to exhaust parallel
state or administrative remedies prior to bringing federal enforcement suit). But see Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973) (noting that judgment
against violator would be res judicata in a later court proceeding against same violator for same
violations, regardless of whether claim is first brought in state or federal court).
174. For example, one advantage is that state enforcement agencies are generally more
readily able to combine federal and state law causes of action—e.g., Clean Air Act claims and
state law claims—in state courts than in federal courts, as the latter but not the former are
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mechanisms supports the inference that state enforcement is not
primarily conducted by civil suit in federal court. This conclusion,
when combined with EPA’s statistics on the allocation of
enforcement between itself and state agencies, confirms that only a
fraction of all agency enforcement under the Clean Air Act is
conducted through civil or criminal suits in federal courts, let alone is
resolved in those courts.
E. Citizens’ Suits
Administrative agencies are not the only entities with a role in
pursuing enforcement of violations of the Clean Air Act. Rather,
Congress provided an enforcement alternative to federal and state
agencies in the form of citizens’ enforcement suits. In addition to
authorizing challenges to EPA’s failure to act, as discussed above,
section 304 provides jurisdiction in the federal district courts for civil
suits against a person (including government entities) who (1) is
currently in violation of “an emission standard or limitation” under
the Act or an EPA or state order with respect to such a standard or
limitation; (2) is alleged to have violated such an order, standard, or
limitation in the past if there is evidence the violation has been
repeated; (3) proposes to construct a new or modified stationary
source without complying with the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) or Non-attainment New Source Review
(NNSR) programs; (4) is currently in violation of the PSD or NNSR
programs, including violations of permit conditions; or (5) has
violated one of those programs, including violations of permit
175
conditions, if there is evidence the violation has been repeated. A
citizens’ suit thus puts enforcement in the hands of a federal court, in
the same way as an EPA enforcement civil suit, giving federal courts
relatively broad substantive power.
In creating the citizens’ suit mechanism, however, Congress
reaffirmed the primacy of EPA and state enforcement in two key
ways. First, in the vast majority of circumstances, a person
contemplating an enforcement suit under this provision must give
written notice of the violation to EPA, to the relevant state authority,
176
and to the violator at least sixty days prior to commencing suit.
During that period, a one-time violator—but not a repeat violator—
subject to the limits on supplemental jurisdiction which are imposed in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(2006).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
176. Id. § 7604(b); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 54.2–54.3 (2010).
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177

may remove the predicate for the suit by coming into compliance.
More importantly, if EPA or the appropriate state agency commences
a civil compliance suit in federal or state court and is “diligently
prosecuting” that suit, a citizens’ suit to enforce the same violation is
178
precluded. As a result, EPA and the relevant state authority are
able to preempt citizens’ suits and retain control of the contours of
enforcement—although the would-be private litigant may still
179
intervene as a matter of right in the EPA or state enforcement suit.
Nevertheless, the availability of the citizens’ suit mechanism has
important repercussions for the respective roles of EPA and the
federal courts in Clean Air Act enforcement. With respect to EPA,
citizens’ suits may force EPA’s hand—EPA, or a state agency, can
180
only preempt a citizens’ enforcement suit by filing its own civil suit.
As a result, the citizens’ suit provides another mechanism, along with
an EPA civil or criminal suit, for a federal district court to take on the
role of trial court in enforcement of the Clean Air Act.
F. Analysis
Overall, the enforcement arena is one in which EPA has
relatively broad authority and federal courts a relatively narrow role.
EPA has broad, if not unfettered, discretion in choosing the method
of enforcement—be it administrative or judicial—and whether to
terminate enforcement (through settlement) prior to a judicial
resolution. Indeed, EPA very frequently chooses these paths—
administrative enforcement and settlement—which limit the role of
the federal judiciary in enforcing the Clean Air Act. That role is also
limited by the predominance of state enforcement, although no
quantitative breakdown of the share of state enforcement conducted
administratively or judicially (in state rather than federal court) is
available. Nevertheless, federal courts retain broad power with
respect to EPA civil or criminal actions and citizens’ suits but that
power is similarly limited by EPA’s preference for settling such cases.

177. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1).
178. Id. § 7604(b)(1)(B).
179. See id.
180. See id. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (A citizens’ suit under Section 304 may not be commenced if
EPA or a state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil [enforcement] action.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Taken as a whole, the federal judiciary does play a significant
role in shaping the content of the Clean Air Act. However, the
significance is anything but uniform. At one end of the spectrum are
section 307 challenges to EPA’s interpretation of statutory provisions.
These cases address the content of the Clean Air Act and have
significant and long-lasting effects on how EPA regulates. It is also an
area where the courts, due to Chevron step one analysis, owe EPA no
deference as they, rather than EPA, determine whether congressional
intent is clear. Finally, the dearth of case law addressing settlements
of section 307 cases suggest that EPA rarely takes these cases away
from the court once a petition is filed.
In section 307 cases that require courts to move beyond Chevron
step-one analysis, the quality and quantity of the court’s authority
over EPA diminishes. With respect to section 307 challenges, both
Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review involve
standards that are deferential to EPA. In addition, the fact-specific
nature of arbitrary and capricious review limits the precedential value
of judicial decisions at that stage. With respect to section 304
challenges, courts are empowered to provide injunctive relief that sets
new deadlines for EPA to meet its statutory obligations. However,
courts are not permitted to address the substance of statutory
provisions, and EPA often preempts judicial resolution of these cases
through settlement. In enforcement actions, courts are empowered to
serve as the trier of fact and law with respect to alleged violations of
the Clean Air Act. But despite the substantive nature of the
judiciary’s oversight role, EPA can short-circuit the court’s influence
by utilizing administrative enforcement actions or by settling cases
that have been filed.
In sum, the federal judiciary plays an active, if not always
substantive, role in shaping the content of the Clean Air Act, and
presumably that of other statutory schemes. However, the
significance of federal courts’ involvement varies. While the longterm influence of any judicial decision is based to a large degree on
the specific facts of the case, this analysis shows that the procedural
posture and structural setting of the case can also play a role in
determining the significance of the decision.

